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Abstract
The author, Professor Richard Delgado, takes as his point of departure a remark by
the chair of the Colorado committee that voted academic sanctions against Ward
Churchill. This essay explores the role of retaliatory motives in academic miscon-
duct cases.
In Churchill’s case, Colorado authorities delved deeply and painstakingly into
Churchill’s publications only when it appeared that the state could not fire him
from his tenured position for his inflammatory remarks on the victims of the 9/11
tragedy. What bearing should the investigation’s relation to the hue and cry that
led to it have on its own legitimacy?
Professor Delgado examines various possible frameworks for analyzing cases like
these and argues that the committee chair’s way of seeing the matter was the in-
correct framework.
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INTRODUCTION 
If academic freedom is of vital concern to many readers of this 
review, it surely lies close to the heart of many in the university 
community.  Teachers, researchers, and many university administrators 
have long recognized the need to police its boundaries and to train close 
attention on forces, including alumni pressure, commercialization, and 
political correctness, that can endanger it. 
Yet relatively few discussions of academic freedom consider indirect 
forces that may intrude just as deeply.  For example, an otherwise 
comprehensive recent symposium1 devotes scant treatment to two such 
forces, one of which figured prominently in the recent University of 
Colorado action against Indian law scholar Ward Churchill.2  Those forces 
 † University Professor of Law & Derrick Bell Fellow, University of Pittsburgh.  J.D., 
University of California -Berkeley, 1974. 
1. Symposium: Horowitz, Churchill, Columbia—What Next for Academic Freedom?, 
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 841 (2006). 
2. On the University of Colorado’s long-running effort to discipline Churchill, see, 
e.g., Kirk Johnson, Colorado U. Chancellor Advises Firing Author of Sept. 11 Essay, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2006, at A11; Inquiry on Research, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A10; 
Kirk Johnson, University Changes Its Focus in Investigation of Professor, N.Y. TIMES, 
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are retaliation and selective prosecution. 
As readers will recall, Churchill published an inflammatory essay, 
entitled “Some People Push Back,”3 on an obscure website one day after 
the terrible events of 9/11.  In it, he reasoned that Americans should not be 
surprised at the terrorists’ horrific act, because the U.S. itself had been 
visiting terror on Iraq through economic sanctions that had killed thousands 
of Iraqi adults and children and tyrannized the citizens of other Muslim 
nations by backing anti-democratic governments willing to cooperate with 
U.S. objectives.4
Churchill further posited that many of the victims of the 9/11 
conflagration were not entirely innocent.  In particular, the CIA agents, 
investment bankers, and stockbrokers who worked in the World Trade 
Center and profited from U.S. imperialism in the Middle East bore indirect 
responsibility for the many deaths associated with it.  Comparing their role 
to that of members of the Nazi high command whom the United States 
charged with war crimes at Nuremberg, Churchill maintained that these 
“little Eichmanns” got exactly what they deserved.5
When, years later, Churchill’s 9/11 remarks came to light in 
connection with a scheduled speech at Hamilton College, they incensed 
many members of the American public who found them insensitive and 
unpatriotic.6  Acting at the request of state authorities, including the 
governor, the legislature, and the board of regents, the Boulder chancellor 
appointed a three-person committee to read everything that Churchill had 
written in the course of a long career to see if any of it, including his 9/11 
remarks, “crossed the line.”7
Mar. 26, 2005, at A9 [hereinafter Johnson, University Changes]; Report and 
Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Research Misconduct Concerning 
Allegations of Research Misconduct by Professor Ward Churchill, June 13, 2006, available 
at http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/StandingCmteReport.html (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Report & Recommendations].  See also Richard Delgado, Shooting the 
Messenger (book review), 30 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 477 (2006), reviewing WARD 
CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS (2003) [hereinafter ROOSTING 
CHICKENS]. 
3. Ward Churchill, “Some People Push Back” On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, 
available at http://www.darknightpress.org/index.php?i=news&c=recent&view=9 (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Push Back]. 
4. Id.  See also ROOSTING CHICKENS, supra note 2, at 5-6, 10-14 (making a similar 
claim). 
5. Push Back, supra note 3; ROOSTING CHICKENS, supra note 2, at 19-20 (explaining 
Churchill’s meaning in somewhat less flamboyant terms).  See also Delgado, supra note 2, 
at 485-87, comparing the two passages. 
6. See Michelle York & Mindy Sink, Professor is Assailed by Legislature and Vandals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at B6. 
7. See Press Release, University of Colorado, CU-Boulder Chancellor Releases Report 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art61
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When, weeks later, the committee concluded that Churchill’s public 
comments, although odious, fell within the First Amendment, the 
Chancellor charged a second committee with considering whether any of 
his writing evidenced academic misconduct.8  After Churchill’s case had 
become prime-time news, the university had begun learning of allegations, 
some years old, that Churchill had committed plagiarism and other 
scholarly infractions and represented himself as an Indian when, in the 
view of his academic rivals, he was not one.9
Several of these charges, including fabrication of an Indian identity, 
fell by the wayside, but others are the subject of a university appeal and 
seem bound for court.10  It is the relation between the first set of 
accusations, based on his 9/11 remarks, and the second, alleging academic 
misconduct, that this essay ponders. 
When the university filed the second set of charges shortly after 
dismissing the first, it was hard to escape the inference that the two events 
were related and that the university had filed the academic charges only 
upon realizing it could not proceed based on Churchill’s 9/11 statements.  
Two of the university committees investigating him expressed misgivings 
over precisely this issue but concluded that they had no choice but to 
proceed anyway.11  One member used the analogy of a traffic stop to 
explain why.12
As she put it, a motorist who is pulled over by a traffic cop because 
his car sports a liberal bumper sticker (such as “Impeach Bush”) has no 
on Churchill Review (Mar. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2005/129.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).  The 
three-person committee consisted of the chancellor, the law dean, and the dean of arts and 
sciences.  Id.  See also WARD CHURCHILL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM/ACADEMIC FRAUD  
(forthcoming 2007) (containing this language). 
8. See Johnson, University Changes, supra note 2.  The university’s standing 
committee on research misconduct appointed an Investigative Committee to consider 
whether Churchill committed academic misconduct, see Report & Recommendations, supra 
note 2, at 3.  For the full May 9, 2006 report of the Investigative Committee, see 
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/churchillreport051606.html (hard copy on 
file with author) [hereinafter Investigative Report]. 
9. Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing charges against 
Churchill). 
10. Id.  At the time of writing, a faculty Privilege and Tenure Committee was hearing 
testimony (including this author’s) on the investigative reports and university’s intent to 
dismiss Professor Churchill. 
11. See Investigative Report, supra note 8, at 3-4; and Ty Gee, Fourth Estate Goes 
AWOL, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, May 27, 2006, at A25 (quoting committee chair 
Marianne Wesson).  See also Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 4-5, 15 (making 
similar argument without the motorist analogy). 
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text, explaining this argument. 
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defense to a ticket if the motorist was, in fact, speeding.  The officer’s 
decision may impinge on the motorist’s First Amendment rights to some 
extent, but this still gives him no excuse for speeding.13
Similarly, this member reasoned that the university’s motives in 
instituting disciplinary procedures against Churchill—indignation over his 
September 11 remarks—were irrelevant to the subsequent charges growing 
out of his Indian law scholarship.14  This was so even if, as Churchill 
pointed out, most prolific scholars whose work came under such intense 
scrutiny would turn out to have committed relatively minor indiscretions 
like the ones the university charged him with.15
It is this aspect of the Churchill proceeding that I wish to examine in 
hopes of shedding light on the concept of selective prosecution and, to a 
lesser extent, retaliation, in general.  Both doctrines accuse a disciplinary 
body with proceeding in bad faith, usually for a worker’s exercise of some 
protected right.  Whistleblower statutes now protect subordinates from 
retaliation for filing environmental or workplace complaints.16
With selective prosecution, the relationship between the precipitating 
grievance and the matter actually alleged can be subtler, so that legal 
doctrine in this area is relatively underdeveloped.  Yet the Churchill case 
shows that society may soon need such a doctrine if it is to maintain an 
effective system of academic freedom.  Without one, administrators overly 
attuned to political tides may suppress protected behavior by subjecting a 
controversial scholar’s work to microscopic examination and filing charges 
based on some minor shortcoming that this examination brings to light. 
I.  THREE MODELS OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 
A.  The Cop and the Bumper Sticker 
Selective enforcement may take at least three forms.  The first is the 
one Ward Churchill’s disciplinary committee thought it had before it.  
13. Id. 
14. Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 3, 15 (explaining that the committee 
considered the university’s motivations in bringing charges against Churchill irrelevant to 
its investigation). 
15. See id., Appendix B, Summary of Fallacies in the University of Colorado 
Investigative Committee Report of May 9, 2006, by Ward Churchill, at 1, 5-6. 
16. See, e.g., Victoria L. Donati & William J. Tarnow, Key Issues and Analysis 
Relating to Retaliation and Whistleblower Claims, Practising Law Institute Litigation and 
Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 745 PMI/Lit 619 (2006) (reviewing a 
wide range of federal and state laws against retaliation against employees); Deborah L. 
Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005) (analyzing the relation of retaliation and 
antidiscrimination law). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art61
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Here, selective prosecution takes the form of charging an offense that, like 
speeding, occurs out in the open and is both incontrovertible and inherently 
dangerous.  Speeding drivers can kill; society has an unquestioned interest 
in deterring motorists who drive too fast, even by a few miles per hour. 
Besides, we reason, if a conservative cop tickets a driver whose car 
bears a liberal bumper sticker (“Impeach Bush”), the next time a liberal cop 
may be the one giving a ticket to the speeder whose car sports a 
conservative sticker (“Support Our Troops”).  So, things even out in the 
long run.  Even though more cops may be conservative than liberal, with 
the result that motorists with liberal bumper stickers end up bearing a 
disproportionate brunt of official displeasure, we do not see the connection 
between ticketing and suppression of speech as sufficiently close to warrant 
giving either type of driver a defense. 
The problem in Ward Churchill’s case is that Type A selective 
enforcement was not actually what the Colorado committee confronted.  
Two much stronger analogies lay close at hand. 
B.  The Cop and the Black Motorist 
Selective enforcement may take on a second, more pernicious form.  
Imagine a police officer who follows a practice of pulling over every black 
male motorist he sees driving an expensive, late-model car.17  Believing 
that a high percentage of such drivers are drug dealers or other small-time 
crooks, he stops each one and conducts a thorough search.  Eventually he 
finds something that is arguably contraband—say, a sharpened screwdriver 
in the glove compartment—and proceeds to arrest the driver. 
Much more problematic than the first type of selective enforcement, 
this variety is unlikely to even out over time, since no plausible profile 
would subject well-behaved white motorists to similar treatment in our 
society.  Moreover, the link between being a black male and a drug dealer 
is unacceptably weak.  Purely statistical, it would target many law-abiding 
black men merely because a small number of their group deal drugs.18 
17. For discussion of one variety of Type B selective enforcement—racial profiling—
see generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK (2002). 
18. See JODY ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS 
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable 
Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) 
(discussing statistical, or “reasonable” racism in which whites train scrutiny and 
enforcement on blacks in general because they believe them statistically more likely than 
other groups to commit crimes).  But see Richard Delgado, Black Crime, White Fears: On 
the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994) (pointing out that black crime 
is less dangerous than the white variety). 
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Unlike speeding, which is dangerous every time, driving while black is not.  
It sends a message—racial suspicion—to other blacks that society has 
wisely decided to reject.19
Ward Churchill’s case shares a disturbing number of features with 
Type B selective enforcement.  In deciding to comb through “every word 
he has written,” the university made plain that it was looking for grounds to 
bring charges against him personally, not, for example, against all 
plagiarists or all historians who accuse the U.S. Army of providing the 
Indians with smallpox-infested blankets.20  Like racial profiling, singling 
out an individual for special attention is unlikely to even out over time.  
Unlike a cop who stops a motorist for speeding, it is not spontaneous and 
isolated, but concerted—the university focuses its full investigative 
resources on one individual.  And the social risk of a careless footnote or 
failure to give credit to another’s work is scarcely as serious as driving too 
fast on a crowded street.  Moreover, it sends a message to the scholarly 
community that if they address controversial topics they had better be 
prepared for a searching examination of their entire body of work. 
C. The Cop and the Gadfly 
A final form of selective prosecution targets someone not because of 
who she is, but because of what she has done—namely, annoyed local 
authorities.  Perhaps she has criticized the city council or clashed with the 
university president.  Perhaps he has opposed a local program, such as 
recycling or dog walking, that enjoys wide community support.  In 
response, the authorities place him under covert investigation.  They assign 
a police officer to tail his car and ask the sanitation department to check 
19. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (arguing that case law and federal policies 
have decisively rejected this position). 
20. Telephone interview with David Getches, Dean, University of Colorado Law 
School (February 2005) (explaining that the three-person committee, of which he was a 
member, set out to read everything that Churchill had written); see also University of 
Colorado at Boulder Review of Churchill Materials, Mar. 24, 2005, 
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/materials.html (listing the books, articles, 
essays, speeches, and interviews that the three-person committee examined); Mike Littwin, 
When Going Gets Tough, Hoffman Gets Going, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Mar. 8, 2005, at 7A 
(describing the three-person committee as combing Churchill’s past speeches); Arthur Kane 
and Amy Herdy, Churchill: Heritage Undisputed Meets with CU Committee, DENVER POST, 
May 25, 2005, at Bl (committee reviewed his writings); Remarks by Interim Chancellor Phil 
DiStefano, http://www.colorado.edu/insidecu/archives/2005/2-8/chancellor.html (“The 
Office of the Chancellor will launch and oversee a thorough examination of Professor 
Churchill's writings, speeches, tape recordings, and other works”) (last visited Mar. 6, 
2007). 
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whether he is segregating his recyclable trash properly.  They encourage 
his neighbors to file noise complaints and turn him in if he lets his grass 
grow long during a vacation.  They ask the IRS to audit his most recent tax 
returns. 
Though all of us can identity with authorities who lose patience with a 
chronically obstructionist citizen, we still would find their response to the 
gadfly excessive.  Although technically within the legitimate power of the 
state—after all, each action is independently justifiable—their response 
deploys one part of the Constitution to defeat another.21  Even though each 
component is permissible, the investigation’s combined effect violates an 
implicit norm of governmental fairness.22
Churchill’s treatment at the hands of the Colorado authorities has 
more in common with Types B and C selective enforcement (which are 
impermissible) than it does with Type A (which is permissible).  As 
mentioned, the second group of charges against him did not grow 
spontaneously out of a readily observed public action.  They were directed 
at a single individual; the university went looking for them; and they are 
not likely to “even out” over time.  And because most of us can imagine 
ourselves in Churchill’s shoes, they send the message that one should not 
say anything calculated to offend the authorities unless one is prepared to 
undergo searching examination. 
II.  THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR UNCONVENTIONAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 
A second issue in cases like Ward Churchill’s is the appropriate 
standard of review.  Scholarly transgressions can, of course, arise in 
conventional fields such as presidential history23 or constitutional theory,24 
where they rarely lead to serious discipline.  For example, Harvard Law 
21. Viz., it deploys the Executive Branch, charged under the Constitution with 
enforcing the laws, against the Bill of Rights, which protects individual values including 
privacy and freedom of speech. 
22. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977) (noting that to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that his or her constitutionally protected conduct was a 
substantial or motivating factor in defendant’s adverse action). 
23. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Author Goodwin Resigns from Pulitzer Board, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A9 (describing plagiarism charges brought against prominent 
presidential historian Doris Kearns Goodwin). 
24. See Law Professor is Reproached, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at A14; Sara Rimer, 
When Plagiarism’s Shadow Falls on Admired Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at B9 
(describing charges of plagiarism against Harvard constitutional law scholar Laurence 
Tribe).  See also RICHARD POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM (2007) (arguing that 
plagiarism is generally not a serious offense). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
DELGADO FINAL 3/28/2007  8:15 PM 
182 Syracuse Law Review           [Vol. 57:175 
 
School recently received allegations of plagiarism by two highly regarded 
scholars, Laurence Tribe and Charles Ogletree, neither of whom was 
writing about a controversial subject.25  Each pleaded simple negligence, 
one in the failure to supervise the work of a research assistant,26 and 
apologized.  Neither had aroused the authorities’ ire by making statements 
about 9/11; both were in good standing at their schools.  Neither received 
any form of public discipline. 
Other times an author like Ward Churchill will have given the 
establishment some recent cause for offense.  In these cases, the authorities 
will often not target the offending speech directly, realizing that this would 
trigger the First Amendment, but will comb through his writings in search 
of some unrelated transgression. 
If the scholar, like Ward Churchill, has spent a lifetime engaged in 
social criticism, these transgressions, like the underlying ground for official 
displeasure, are apt to stem from passages about governmental misconduct.  
In the Colorado case, two of the allegations charged factual errors in 
Churchill’s account of a pair of historical incidents of deliberate smallpox 
transmission,27 while others had to do with his interpretation of two federal 
statutes, one of which (the Indian Allotment Act)28 Churchill labeled a 
“blood quantum” measure similar to Hitler’s Nuremberg Laws.29  Four of 
the six charges against him thus arose from his writings on governmental 
impropriety. 
What standard of review should apply in such cases? 
A.  When the Scholar is Investigating Governmental Misconduct 
Every scholar who investigates governmental misconduct should 
enjoy wide latitude.  In the related area of First Amendment law, one finds 
the rule that the government may not sue for defamation.30  Even if the 
charges of an investigative reporter, for example, turn out to be untrue, the 
25. See Rimer, supra note 24 (describing plagiarism charges brought against Harvard 
law professor Charles Ogletree). 
26. See sources cited notes 22-23, supra. 
27. See Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing charges 
against Churchill). 
28. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, codified at 25 U.S.C. 331 et 
seq. 
29. Id. 
30. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964); Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (stating that “history dictated extreme caution in 
imposing liability”); LAURENCE  H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786-87, 862-66 
(2d ed. 1988).  On the background leading up to Sullivan, see Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan 
Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1223 
(1992). 
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government will go without recourse.  We strike the balance in this fashion 
because speech by which citizens call government to account lies at the 
heart of the First Amendment.31  Statements that would be actionable if 
leveled against an ordinary citizen are beyond redress if the target is the 
government. 
The law of human experimentation exhibits a similar asymmetry.  All 
campuses that conduct federally-sponsored research are required to 
maintain human subjects protection committees (sometimes called 
“institutional review boards” or “human research committees”) that 
evaluate proposals for university research that uses human beings as 
subjects of study.32  The committees are charged with assuring that 
researchers minimize the risk of harm to such subjects, protect their 
confidentiality, and secure their informed consent.33
One of the relatively few exceptions to these requirements is research 
into the performance of a governmental agency or program.  Here, a “fast 
track” procedure enables the investigator to secure permission more readily 
than when the proposal contemplates research using prisoners, children, or 
members of another vulnerable group.34  Thus a researcher who sought to 
investigate misconduct in connection with a campus program such as 
affirmative action or intercollegiate sports would receive a near-free pass.  
Because the research looks to establish governmental accountability and is 
an example of “research up” rather than “research down,” it is a candidate 
for quick approval. 
A third area that will be familiar to readers with backgrounds in 
31. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 786-87.  See generally Michael Kent Curtis, Monkey 
Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of Dissent, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
507 (1995) (criticism receives highest protection when aimed at the most powerful). 
32. For the federal regulations that establish institutional review boards, see 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.101 (2005).  For a discussion of their operation, see CARL COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS 
AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS ch. 3 (2005).  For Colorado’s 
regulations, see University of Colorado at Denver, Policies and Procedures of the Human 
Subjects Research Committee, available at, http://thunder1.cudenver.edu/osp/HSRCpol.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007). 
33. See, e.g., University of Colorado, Human Research Committee, Standard Operating 
Procedures, available at http://www.colorado.edu/VCResearch/HRC/SOP_TOC.html; 
University of  Colorado, Human Research Committee Guidance Documents, 
http://www.colorado.edu/VCResearch/HRC/guidance.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
34. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2005) (exempting research examining the performance of 
elected or public officials, and projects which evaluate public benefit programs).  On the 
protection of vulnerable groups, see University of Colorado, Human Research Committee, 
Standard Operating Procedures, Protocol 21 – Vulnerable Subjects, available at: 
http://www.colorado.edu/VCResearch/HRC/downloads/HRC21.doc (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
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literary theory is satire.35  Here, the mechanism is self-selection, not 
official enforcement, but the compliance rate is nearly one hundred percent.  
The practice to which I refer is that of the classical satirists, such as 
Voltaire or Jonathan Swift, or, in our time, Russell Baker, of reserving their 
slings and arrows for the high and the mighty—kings, nobles, and others 
who abused power or puffed themselves up self-importantly.  They rarely, 
if ever, used their wit to ridicule beggars, cripples, orphans, or others of 
lower status than themselves.  A root word of humor is humus, bringing 
down, close to earth; one recalls how Roman emperors would employ 
members of their retinue to accompany them during victory parades, 
whispering in their ear, “[t]hou art but a man.”36
This practice captures the same asymmetry that we found in free 
speech law and human-subjects experimentation.  Power exerted downward 
is simply more problematic than when exerted in the opposite direction.  
Consequently, a scholar, such as Ward Churchill,37 Noam Chomsky,38 or 
Howard Zinn,39 who investigates governmental misconduct should enjoy 
freedom from prosecution for all but the most egregious errors. 
B.  Unscholarly Sources: The Role of the Official Account 
A further reason for affording the scholar investigating governmental 
impropriety wide leeway is simply that his burden is heavier than most.  
History is always written by the victors, so that the official account of any 
period is apt to downplay governmental criminality or racism.40  Thus, the 
historian whose instinct tells him that something is amiss with the official 
account will, of necessity, be forced to resort to unconventional sources, 
such as oral history, letters, diaries, or other “stories from below.”41  To an 
unsympathetic investigator, these may bespeak an unscholarly attitude. 
Churchill’s committee report, for example, took him to task for using 
35. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1061, 1067-71 (1994). 
36. Id. at 1091.  See also Leslie Kim Treiger, Note, Protecting Satire Against Libel 
Claims: A New Reading of the First Amendment’s Opinion Privilege, 98 YALE L.J. 1215 
(1989) (noting the need to extend constitutional protection of satirical speech because of its 
vital role in political and social criticism). 
37. See e.g., A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE 
AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT (1997). 
38. See e.g., HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE 
(2003). 
39. See e.g., A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-PRESENT (2003). 
40. See e.g., ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 1-23 (2006). 
41. Id. 
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such unconventional materials,42 when, in fact, they might well have been 
the only ones at his disposal.  To draw an analogy to the human-subjects 
review process, his committee gave him the precise opposite of a “free 
pass.”  It treated his efforts to call government to task with the aid of 
unconventional sources as proof of scholarly ineptitude, when those 
sources might well have been the best ones available to anyone pursuing 
his line of inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
If scholars never took risks, paradigms would change very slowly.  It 
they refrained from criticizing government, books such as Peter Irons’ 
“Justice at War,”43 Vincent Harding’s “There is a River”44 or Rachel 
Carson’s “Silent Spring”45 would not have been written.  If society is to 
rely on academic researchers to investigate governmental misconduct, it 
must be prepared to afford them wide leeway.46  It must be alert for 
censorship that takes the form of retaliation or selective prosecution.  And 
it must exercise special vigilance when powerful constituencies are 
demanding retribution and other, more cautious scholars are waiting in the 
wings to see what happens. 
 
42. See Investigative Report, supra note 8, at 94 (accusing Churchill of using 
American Indian oral traditions “disingenuously”); see also id. at 6 (noting that 
“interdisciplinary work and . . . ethnic studies . . . may require an even stronger fealty to 
standards” of conventional scholarship); Id. at 45-46 n.98 (rejecting any suggestion that 
scholars challenging historical beliefs may take liberties with evidence and presentation). 
43. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT (1983) (re-examining official evidence for wartime internment of Japanese). 
44. VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN 
AMERICA (1993) (recounting history of abolitionism and the civil rights movement). 
45. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (advancing early case for 
environmentalism). 
46. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, the Supreme Court 
noted that academic freedom is a “special concern of the First Amendment” because the 
country’s future depends on “leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange 
of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind 
of authoritative selection,’” 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), quoting United States v. Associated 
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
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